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Federal Taxation
by Timothy J. Peaden"
Procedural issues once again dominated the federal tax cases decided
by the Eleventh Circuit. During 1994, the court considered cases
involving the assessment procedure, jurisdiction issues, transferee
liability, priority of liens, and other procedural issues.
I.
A.

INCOME TAXES

Tax Assessments

The issue in Hempel v. United States1 was whether the taxpayers had
waived their right to a notice of deficiency.' The tangled facts of this
case required the Eleventh Circuit to consider a number of the procedural provisions in the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"). Seeking to tie the
results of their case to another case being tried in the United States Tax
Court, the taxpayers first executed a series of consents to waive the
statute of limitations' and then a closing agreement in which they

* Partner in the firm of Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Georgia. Wichita State University
(B.B.A., 1980; M.S. 1981); Vanderbilt University (J.D., 1984). Executive Authorities Editor,
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law.
1. 14 F.3d 572 (11th Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 574. If the Internal Revenue Service determines that there is a deficiency in
income, estate, or gift taxes, it will send a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C.
§ 6212(a) (1988). Because the taxpayer has 90 days in which to file a petition with the
United States Tax Court contesting the deficiency, the notice of deficiency is commonly
referred to as the "90-day letter." 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a).
3. 14 F.3d at 574. The statute of limitations for assessing an income tax deficiency is
typically three years (26 U.S.C. § 6501(a)), although that period can be extended by
agreement of the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(cX4). The taxpayers in this case executed a
series of such consents, culminating with the execution of a Form 872-A (Special Consent
to Extend the Time to Assess Tax). 14 F.3d at 575. The limitation period for assessing tax
was thus extended to ninety days after the taxpayers terminated the extension by filing
a Form 872-T (Notice of Termination of Special Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax).
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agreed to be bound by the results of the other case.4 The closing
agreement provided:
The amount of any federal income tax that becomes due from the
taxpayers under the terms of this agreement may be assessed by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on or before the expiration of the
one year (365 days) period following the date on which the decision in
the controlling cases become [sic] final, notwithstanding the expiration
of any period of limitation on assessment and collection otherwise
prescribed by the Internal Revenue Code section 6501. This assessment shall be made without the issuance of the notice of deficiency
authorized by ... section 6212 and without regard to the restrictions
otherwise imposed by... section 6213."

Two years after Sutton was decided, the taxpayers terminated their
consent to the extension of the statute of limitations." The IRS assessed
the taxes due under the closing agreement and did not send a notice of
deficiency. The taxpayers then brought this action to enjoin the
collection of taxes.'
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the case,
albeit for different reasons.' The issue was whether, as contended by
the taxpayers, the closing agreement required the IRS to issue a notice
of deficiency unless the taxes were assessed within one year of the
decision in the Sutton litigation.10 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
taxpayer's interpretation was inconsistent with the plain language of the
closing agreement and that it was illogical in view of the circumstances
surrounding the agreement.

4. 14 F.3d at 574. Section 7121(a) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the
Secretary of the Treasury to enter into a written agreement with any person regarding a
tax liability. 14 F.3d at 574 n.10.
5. 14 F.3d at 575 (emphasis in original).

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. Under the Anti-Injunction Act, courts cannot enjoin the Internal Revenue
Service from collecting or assessing taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1988). One exception,
relied upon by the taxpayers in Hempel, is when the Internal Revenue Service fails to send
the notice of deficiency. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6212(a), 6212(c), 6213(a), 7421(a). Taxpayers,
however, can waive the right to a notice of deficiency. 26 U.S.C. § 6213(d).
9. 14 F.3d at 576. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the taxpayers that the district
court's reliance on equitable grounds was misplaced when considering an issue of
jurisdiction. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that affirmance was proper if the
lower court decision was correct for any reason. Id.
10. Id. at 576-77.
11. See 14 F.3d 572, 577-79. The taxpayers in this case did not argue that the taxes
were incorrect, but rather that they were entitled to a notice of deficiency prior to
assessment. Id. at 575. The Eleventh Circuit could not discern a rational explanation why
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In Feldman u. Commissioner,12 the Eleventh Circuit considered the
validity of consents to waive the statute of limitations. 1" It was
uncontroverted that the taxpayers had entered into the consents and had
not terminated their consents by filing a Form 872-T for the years at
issue.'4 After the IRS issued a notice of deficiency, the taxpayers filed
a petition in the Tax Court challenging the deficiency."5 The Tax Court
rejected the taxpayers' argument that the consents were invalid and,
after a trial, upheld the deficiencies.'"
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the taxpayers' argument that the
consents were invalid due to fraud and misrepresentation. 7 Relying
on a Seventh Circuit decision in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Commissioner,"
the taxpayers argued they signed the consents based upon the understanding that "meaningful" settlement negotiations would ensue.' 9 The
court found first that there were settlement negotiations and second that
Borg-Warner was inapposite.' In particular, the issue in Borg-Warner
was whether the IRS terminated the consent by mailing a letter stating
that no mutually satisfactory basis for settling the matter was reached
and that a notice of deficiency would be sent.2 ' In Feldman it was clear
that the consent was not terminated until the taxpayers filed Form 872T22

"Innocent Spouse" Defense
Although frequently claimed, courts rarely allow the "innocent spouse"
defense to a taxpayer.' In Kistner v. Commissioner,'4 the Eleventh

B.

the closing agreement would require a notice of deficiency after the one year period, given
that the purpose of the closing agreement was to bind the parties to the result in Sutton.
Id. at 578.
12. 20 F.3d 1128 (11th Cir. 1994).
13. Id. at 1133.
14. Id. at 1131.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1132.
18. 660 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1981).
19. 20 F.3d at 1132.
20. See id. at 1132-34.
21. Id. at 1133.
22. Id.
23. Although both parties to a joint return are liable for any deficiency, § 6013(e) of the
Internal Revenue Code provides that relief may be granted to the "innocent spouse" if each
of the following is established: (a) a joint return is filed; (b) there is a substantial
understatement of tax attributable to the grossly erroneous items of one spouse; (c) the
other spouse establishes that he or she did not know, and had no reason to know, that
there was a substantial understatement of tax; and (d) it is inequitable to hold the spouse
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Circuit reversed the Tax Court and found the defense to be applicable.2"
Lucille Kistner and George W Weasel, Jr. were married for twenty-four
years, divorced for a two-year period, remarried for four more years, and
then divorced again.' Throughout these years the taxpayers enjoyed
an affluent lifestyleY The Commissioner determined that for years
1979 and 1980, during the second marriage, the couple received
additional income of $1,142,681 and $1,386,134 relating to personal
expenses paid by their corporation.' The Tax Court rejected Kistner's
"innocent spouse" claim, finding that while she may have been unaware
of the "precise tax implications of the payments ... she was or should
have been aware of the payments, and she had a duty to make further
inquiry as to the proper tax treatment thereof."2
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed that the taxpayer had "reason to
31
know" of the tax deficiency."0 Relying on Stevens v. Commissioner,
the Eleventh Circuit enumerated a four-part test to determine whether
a taxpayer had a "reason to know": (1) the taxpayer's level of education;
(2) the taxpayer's involvement in the family's business and financial
affairs; (3) lavish or unusual expenditures as compared with the past;
and (4) the culpable spouse's evasiveness and deceit regarding the
couple's finances.3 2 In this case, the Tax Court found that the taxpayer
was not a high school graduate and was not significantly involved in the
33
financial affairs of the couple, thus satisfying the first two criteria.
While the Tax Court found that the third criterion was unsatisfied, it
"seemed to determine lavishness based on the dollar value of the
expenditure rather than evaluating the rarity of the expense. 4 Noting
that "one person's luxury may be another's necessity," the Eleventh
Circuit stated that the "lavishness of any expense must be measured

liable for the tax attributable to the substantial understatement. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 6013(eX1).
24. 18 F.3d 1521 (11th Cir. 1994).
25. Id. at 1522.
26. Id. at 1523-24.
27. Id. at 1523. In the initial divorce the taxpayer received the 10-acre estate, complete
with swimming pool, tennis court, clubhouse, and airplane landing strip, and annual
income of $225,000. Id. at 1522. During the remarriage the taxpayer received a monthly
cash allowance of $15,000. Id. at 1523. Following the second divorce the taxpayer received
a lump sum alimony payment of $4,280,000. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1525.
31. 872 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1989).
32. 18 F.3d at 1525.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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from each family's relative level of ordinary support."m In this case,
the expenditures in question were no more lavish than those to which
the taxpayer was accustomed. 6
37
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Feldman v. Commissioner,
rejected the taxpayers' "innocent spouse" defense.' As noted previously, each of the requirements of section 6013(e) must be met in order for
the defense to be applicable, and the issue in this case was whether the
deductions claimed were "grossly erroneous."' Although the Tax Court
had denied the deductions in question, it further held that the deductions were not "grossly erroneous."40 The Eleventh Circuit agreed.41
II. ESTATE AND Gin TAXES
In Baptiste v. Commissioner,42 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Tax
Court's grant of summary judgment to the government.43 The taxpayer
was the beneficiary of an estate which was previously found to owe a tax
deficiency." The Commissioner asserted transferee liability against the
taxpayer, relying on section 6324(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code.4
Given the specific statutory provision imposing transferee liability, the
Eleventh Circuit first rejected the taxpayer's argument that transferee
status should be based on state law.4 Next, the court found that the
amount of the tax liability had been properly determined in the prior
proceeding, and the taxpayer's attempt to recompute the amount was
barred by res judicata.4 7 Finally, the court found the taxpayer was
liable for interest on the tax deficiency, and that the limitation on

35. Id.
36.

Id.

37. 20 F.3d 1128 (11th Cir. 1994).
38. Id. at 1137.
39. Id. at 1135.
40. Id. at 1137. This requirement of "grossly erroneous" often results in a denial of the
innocent spouse defense while the taxpayers are held liable for the tax.
41. Id.
42. 29 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir. 1994).
43. Id. at 1535.
44. Id. at 1535-36.
45. Id. at 1536. 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) provides:
If the estate tax imposed by chapter 11 is not paid when due, then the spouse,
transferee, trustee ... , or beneficiary, who receives, or has on the date of the
decedents death, property included in the gross estate under sections 2034 to
2042, inclusive, to the extent of the value, at the time the decedent's death, of
such property, shall be personally liable for such tax.
29 F.3d at 1538.
46. 29 F.3d at 1538-39.
47. See id. at 1539-41.
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transferee liability found in section 6324(a)(2) is inapplicable to the
interest obligation."
III.

OTHER PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A.

Tax Court Jurisdiction
In McMullen v. Commissioner,"" the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court's denial of a motion for redetermination of interest following
a stipulated decision as to the amount of the tax deficiency 0 Following decisions in other circuits, the court determined that the taxpayer
must pay the interest before the Tax Court has jurisdiction to decide the
dispute.51
B. LitigationFees
52
In re Rasbury
was a case of first impression. After Chapter 11
debtors successfully defeated a claim for withholding taxes, they
requested attorney fees pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7430."3 The Eleventh
Circuit, faced with the question for the first time,' held that abuse of
discretion was the standard of review for the denial of attorney fees.55
The court found unpersuasive the debtors' argument that a different rule

48. Id. at 1541-42. The court determined that § 6601 imposes interest on the
transferees' liability. Id. at 1541. The more vexing issue is whether the § 6324(a)(2)
limitation, which prevents the tax liability of a transferee being greater than the assets
received, is applicable to the interest obligation. Finding that the interest obligation is that
of the transferee, and that the purpose of interest is to compensate the government for the
use of its money, the court ruled against the taxpayer. 29 F.3d at 1541. This result can
lead to a situation where the beneficiary owes the government more than what was
received from the estate.
49. 27 F.3d 510 (11th Cir. 1994).
50. Id. at 511.
51. Id. at 510-11. Accord Asciutto v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 108 (9th Cir. 1994); Littfin
v. Commissioner, 17 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 1994); Bax v. Commissioner, 13 F.3d 54 (2d Cir.
1993); Amlie v. Commissioner, 73 A.F.T.R. 2d 416 (P-H) (1993); Frantz v. Commissioner,
4 F.3d 990 (5th Cir. 1993).
52. 24 F.3d 159 (11th Cir. 1994).
53. Id. at 161.
54. Id. at 165. The six circuits previously considering the issue applied the abuse of
discretion standard. See TKB Intl, Inc. v. United States, 995 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1993);
Wilfong v. United States, 991 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1993); Pate v. United States, 982 F.2d 457
(10th Cir. 1993); Cassuto v. Commissioner, 936 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1991); Bowles v. United
States, 947 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Arthur Andersen & Co., 832 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir.
1987).
55. 24 F.3d at 166.
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should apply because the district court reviewed the bankruptcy court's
determination de novo.'
C. Tax Liens

Another case arising in a bankruptcy context, In re Haas,57 considered the priority of a federal tax lien filed after a mortgagee's erroneous
release of mortgage, but before it was reinstated.' The bankruptcy
court and the district court, relying on Alabama law, held that the
reinstated mortgage had priority.59 The Eleventh Circuit reversed. '
After determining that a judgment creditor without notice of an
erroneously released lien would have priority under Alabama law,61 the
Eleventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in
Dragstrem v. Obermeyer:62

the IRS should enjoy the status of a

"hypothetical judgment creditor.' Moreover, the court found "that the
Treasury Regulations forbid application of a relation back principle to
award an unperfected tax lien priority over the tax lien.""
IV.

A

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES

"ResponsiblePerson"Penalty

"Responsible persons" who "willfully" fail to pay withholding taxes for
employees are personally liable for those taxes.' In Malloy v. United
States," the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the "willful" require67
ment can be satisfied only by actual knowledge of the failure to pay.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. at 166-68.
31 F.3d 1081 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1082.
Id.
Id. at 1092.

61. Id. at 1086.
62. 549 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1977).
63. 31 F.3d at 1087. The court reasoned that this result was consistent with the
language of 26 U.S.C. § 6323(h)(1) and the Federal Tax Lien Act. 31 F.3d at 1087.
64. 31 F.3d at 1091 (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-l(aX2) (1976)).
65. See 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a). Section 6672(a) provides that:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax

imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account
for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any such tax or the payments thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded,

or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over.
26 U.S.C. § 6672(a).
66. 17 F.3d 329 (11th Cir. 1994).
67. Id. at 332.
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John Malloy, a fifty percent owner of a condominium management
company, was assessed the withholding taxes for the fourth quarter of
1982 and the first two quarters of 1983.6 Malloy did not contest the
finding that he was a "responsible person."' He instead challenged the
assessment based on his lack of actual knowledge of the unpaid
withholding tax liability until July 1983.70 He argued that the "willful"
requirement could only be satisfied if there was a finding of actual
knowledge of the tax deficiency. 1
Relying on the former Fifth Circuit decision in Mazo v. United
States,72 the Eleventh Circuit found that actual knowledge was
unnecessary.7" Instead, "a reckless disregard of a known or obvious
risk of nonpayment" is sufficient to satisfy the "willful" criteria.74 The
court found that Malloy was aware of the corporation's financial
difficulties by February 1983, and that he failed to make any inquiry
regarding the payment of taxes. 5 These facts were sufficient to uphold
the district court's finding that Malloy acted with "reckless disregard"
concerning the nonpayment of the taxes.76
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Malloy's argument that he should
not be held liable for the 1982 taxes because those taxes predated his
knowledge of the corporation's financial difficulties.77 The court instead
applied the general rule that once a responsible person becomes aware
(or should have become aware) of unpaid taxes, the failure to pay those
taxes while paying other creditors constitutes a "willful" failure to pay
the taxes.78

68. Id. at 331.
69. Id. at 332. The term "responsible person' is not defined in the statute. Typically,
the term includes anyone in a position or with authority to ensure the payment of the
taxes. See, e.g., Haffa v. United States, 516 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975) (defined as persons
who have the power to control the decision-making process regarding the allocation of
funds to the creditors). It is unclear whether Mr. Malloy held a formal position of authority
within the corporation. It is clear that he took certain management actions, including the
firing of one employee because of the shortage of funds and the signing of checks to
creditors. 17 F.3d at 331.
70. 17 F.3d at 332. Mr. Malloy's testimony on this point was contradicted by the other
co-owner of the business. Id. at 331. It was unnecessary for the court to resolve this
conflict because of its holding that the statute did not require actual knowledge.
71. Id. at 332.
72. 591 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
73. 17 F.3d at 332.
74. Id.
75, Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 332-33.
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Although not addressed in Malloy, it is often an issue whether a
shareholder is a "responsible person" within the meaning of Section
6672. Most courts have required that the shareholder actually exercise
some authority regarding the disbursement of funds; 79 while other
courts have held that the existence of the authority was sufficient."
The court in Maloy did not have to consider this issue because the
shareholder did exercise management authority including the disbursement of funds, which courts typically have found to be the most
important fact when determining whether a person was a "responsible
person."
Tax Crimes
In United States v. Morris,81 the Eleventh Circuit found that the trial
court erred when it failed to give a jury instruction concerning the
defendants' good faith defense. 2 Charged with filing false income tax
returns in violation of Section 7206(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, the
defendants admitted that the returns were erroneous, but asserted that
the returns were filed with the belief that they were correct." In
Cheek v. United States," the Supreme Court defined the statutory
"willfulness" requirement as the voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty." The Eleventh Circuit noted that Cheek "clearly

B.

articulates the requirements of a good-faith defense ...

and as such

serves as the basis for determining the sufficiency of jury instrucThe Eleventh Circuit found the given jury instruction to be
tions.'
deficient in two respects. First, it defined the term "knowingly" as
meaning "'that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not
because of mistake or accident.'""7 This was error because, under the
Cheek standard, "mistake" can be the basis of a good faith defense.s"
Second, Cheek does not require the good faith of a defendant to be
objectively reasonable." Here, the Eleventh Circuit held "[allthough

79. See generally In re Premo, 116 B.R. 515 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Mich. 1990) (reviewing a
number of cases on this subject).

See, e.g., Cassidento v. United States, 90-1 USTC (CCH) 50,171 (D.Conn. 1990).
20 F.3d 1111 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1115.
498 U.S. 192 (1991).
Id. at 202.
20 F.3d at 1115.
Id. at 1117.
Id.
89. Id. The court noted that this is a "notable departure from the more traditional
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

crime, where mistake of the law is no defense." Id.
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there is no requirement in this circuit that jury instructions specifically
note that a good-faith defense need not be objectively reasonable, when
viewed as a whole the charge here is insufficient to convey the permissible breadth of the appellants' Cheek good-faith defense.' °
In United States v. Paul, 1 the Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant
was not entitled to a jury instruction that multiple cash withdrawals
exceeding $10,000 must be performed in a single day.' The defendant
was convicted of unlawful currency structuring when he converted a
cashier's check into cash over a period of days." The court rejected the
defendant's arguments that the currency statute did not cover multiple
days prior to the enactment of a Treasury Regulation defining "structuring" to include transactions over a period of time."4 The defendant also
was not entitled to rely on regulations which would not require banks to
aggregate transactions for reporting purposes.9"
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the 1994 year was the utter lack
of attention to substantive tax issues. Even in the income and estate
and gift tax areas, the Eleventh Circuit's decisions centered on the
procedural sections of the Internal Revenue Code. This trend, occurring
in other circuits as well, simply tracks the increasing complexity of the
procedures for assessing and collecting the tax.

90. Id. at 1118.
91. 23 F.3d 365 (11th Cir. 1994).
92. Id. at 367.
93. Id. at 366. Defendant was charged with violating 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322 and 5324(3).
23 F.3d at 366.
94. 23 F.3d at 367.
95. Id. at 367-68.

